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Abstract
In this paper we evaluate the expected evolution of the Trattamento di ne rap-
porto (TFR) over the Italian employeesworking life careers. Using amministrative
data we disentangle the amount that is expected to be accumulated until retire-
ment, the amount expected not to accrue because of discountinuos working careers
and/or paid as an anticipated withdrawal. This is relevant in the light of the re-
cent pension system reforms that strongly encourage the diversion of the TFR to
pension funds. Our results evidence that for a coeval of working groups the TFR
expected to be accumulated until retirement may be relatively modest, conrming
the skeptical view about its universal role as retirement wealth and raise serious
concerns on strict prenalizations from using it during working life in case of long
term unemployment.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the core debate underlying the Italian private pensions reforms was on
the opportunity to use the Trattamento di Fine Rapporto (TFR) as the primary source
to nance Italian employeesprivate pension provisions. In particular, the reforms have
been questioned as too naively trusting in voluntary TFR diversions to pension funds (see
Castellino and Fornero, 2000). The debate is still actual given that the majority of Italian
employees seem reluctant to divert the TFR to pension funds (Cozzolino, 2006).
The skepticism about the TFR ability to mount adequate retirement wealth grounds on
its dual role as retirement and bu¤er wealth which seems to be empirically supported given
that the observed average TFR across ages is markedly lower than the amount associated
with theoretical continuous job careers (Castellino and Fornero, 2000). However, due
to lack of data, no previous study attempts to provide a quantitative measure of its
ability to mount adequate additional wealth at retirement nor the expected leakages that
potentially undermine its accumulation process and thus its potential e¤ectiveness as
pension provision. In this paper, we use microdata to evaluate the expected distribution
of the TFR over working life careers. In particular, for working groups dened according
to demographic and occupational characteristics, we disentangle how much of the TFR
can be expected to be accumulated until the end of the working life and thus potentially
available for retirement needs (ETFRRETt ) from the amount that is expected to outow
from the accumulation process because of job termination (ETFRBUFt ) and/or advanced
withdrawals (ETFRLIQt ).
The TFR is a lump-sum payment received by employees upon job termination. For
each employee, each year of the job relationship the employer accumulates a fraction
(6.91%) of the annual salary which is recapitalized at a pre dened interest rate (1.5%
+0.75 of the annual ination). The accumulated TFR fund is then paid when a job
separation occurs regardless of its causes or at retirement; the employee working more
than eight consecutive years with the same employer can obtain a partial withdrawal on
the accumulated TFR to nance home purchase or medicare. Given this legal setup,
the TFR plays essentially two mutually exclusive roles. First, in case of continuous job
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careers until retirement, it may contribute to build ones pension wealth being a lump sum
payment totally available at retirement. Second, it may act as a social shock absorber
("ammortizzatore sociale") to overcome nancial burdening from liquidity constraints
and/or adverse income shocks1.
According to pension reforms, employees must decide whether to retain the TFR
within the rm ("TFR in rms, henceforth) or to divert it to pension funds ("TFR in
pension funds" henceforth)2. The reforms will succeed to the extent that workers opt for
TFR diversion to pension funds but also as long as they do not use it before retirement
because of dismissal and/or binding liquidity constraints, since in these cases they may
obtain the accrued positions just as in the case of "TFR in rms". If for a non negligible
number of coeval workers the chance of job separation and/or withdrawing behavior is
high then the potential outows from the TFR accumulation may be substantial and the
reform fail to meet the goal. Indeed, prior research shows that, vis à vis the lump sum
distribution option, the majority of U.S. workers cashes out from pension funds when
facing job dismissal (Poterba et al. 1998; Burman et al. 1999), raising concerns about
the potential inadequacy of retirement wealth, especially for low income earners3.
Although they share common liquidability rules during working life, TFR "in rms"
and TFR "in pension funds" di¤er with respect to payouts convenience before retirement.
First, the asymmetric scal treatment makes it very costly cashing out from pension
funds upon dismissal. Unconditional withdrawing upon job separation in case of TFR "in
pension funds" is taxed at the progressive rate, while tax rebates are gained on up to the
1In case of discontinuous job careers, the TFR received upon contract termination-voluntary or not-
represents additional private savings freely disposable to smooth consumption either for precautionary
motives, for example to self-insure when the layo¤ is followed by an unemployment spell or for whatever
purpose (Borella et al., 2009; nd that TFR recipients increase the amount spent on durables upon
voluntary job termination). In addition, during the job contract, the TFR can be used through advanced
withdrawals to nance specic needs thus acting as a liquidity bu¤er to overcome nancial constraints or
to avoid drawings from other private savings.
2More precisely, after the reform, for workers employed in large rms (more than 50 employees) the
TFR is accumulated in a public fund managed by the Italian Bureau for Social Security (INPS) rather
than by single rms. TFR that accumulates in this public fund follows the same rules as the TFR
accumulated in single rms, thus, in this paper we will refer to it as TFR "in rms".
3Cashing out patterns tend to display a high degree of heterogeneity across workers being inversely
related to age, earnings and entitlements size (Yakoboski, 1997 and Engelhardt, 2002). Hurd and Panis
(2006) nd that among plans allowing for a lump sum distribution upon job separation, 20% is on average
cashed out and that cashing out is more frequent among low income earners who thus are likely to be
poor also at old ages.
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50%   100% of the TFR stock conditionally to an unemployment status of a minimum
of 12   48 months. Conversely, the amount obtained upon job separation on "TFR in
rms" is always taxed at the more favorable individual average rate. Thus, pension funds
participants are strongly induced to avoid early withdrawal which could result in heavy
penalization if job separations are followed by persistent unemployment. Coherently, our
analysis of careers dynamics underlying the TFR accumulation will not be conned to
the threatening of job separation but will also account for the chance of re-employment.
Second, the TFR "in rms" is rewarded at a safe but relatively modest interest rate
with a partial guarantee on performance4, while the TFR "in pension funds" is invested
in nancial markets and thus it is rewarded at a potentially higher but even riskier ex-
pected rate, depending both on the performance of nancial assets and on the portfolio
allocation. Although a diversied portfolio is likely to outperform the rewards from the
TFR "in rms" over the medium/long term5, in the short run yields are likely to be more
volatile resulting in lower chance of matching the performance of the TFR "in rms".
Greater chance of using the TFR because of job separation and/or advance withdrawal
may translates into higher risk of accrued position being unsuitable for smoothing con-
sumption if the potential investment horizon shortening is neglected. The analysis carried
out here will detect those working groups who more likely need to cash out the TFR be-
fore retirement and for whom more conservative investment strategies are likely to be
appropriate.
To derive the expected composition of the TFR we rely on a probabilistic model that
tracks the TFR available to full time Italian employees6 at each age of their working
life conditional on being employed7. In order to evaluate the probability distributions
driving the model we use data from the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) drawn from
4As specied above, the legal return rate amounts to one and a half per cent plus the 75 percent of
the rate of change in prices.
5Assuming valid the property of mean reversion of returns of nancial assets.
6We focus on full time employees, since the inclusion of part time workers would entail considering
separate labor supply functions to account for di¤erences in factors underlying the decision between the
two margins, which is beyond the scope of the present study.
7Alternatively, we could evaluate the unconditional expected composition of the TFR at each point
of the life cycle, i.e. the amount that is expected to accumulate if employed and the amount that could
be accumulated but fails to accrue because of the persistence in the unemployment status.
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matched employers-employees administrative archives which provide detailed information
on individual job spells, earnings and the accumulated TFR. Since these data do not
convey information about wealth, consumption or saving behavior we are unable to ob-
serve how the TFR withdrawn before retirement is used. Nevertheless, our analysis turns
out to be valuable since we are able to evaluate the expected amount that at each age
fails to continue to accumulate in the TFR account due to job discontinuity or advanced
withdrawing behavior.
Our results evidence that on average the largest amount of the accumulated TFR is
expected to be available at retirement, though theres substantial heterogeneity across
working groups. The ETFRRETt tends to be hump shaped with respect to age, reecting
the dynamics of transitions in and out the employment status. The specularily "U" shaped
ETFRBUFt could partially rationalize some evidence on pension funds participantsasset
allocation choices. In particular, the distribution of participants to the most conservative
(guaranteed and xed term) investment lines is "U" shaped across ages (COVIP, 2012)
which is coherent with the pattern of job dismissal risk but denitely contrasts with
theoretical predictions of optimal risk exposure decreasing with age common to standard
nancial models that abstract from the potential impact of discontinuous careers.
Moreover, the ETFRBUFt can overcome the ETFR
RET
t if the probability of separation
is high and the chance of re-employment is low, namely for females, blue collars, workers
in southern regions and in the construction industry. For example, for females working
in small rms it may account on average for 50% of the total potential TFR. Finally,
our results show that, since only a minority of workers cashes out their TFR during the
working life, the expected ETFRLIQt represents a small portion of the total potentially
accumulated reaching the maximum level at middle ages being the chance of withdrawing
in advance increasing with the tenure as well as the amount accumulated.
A second strand of critics to pension reforms focusses on the potential burden that
TFR diversions pose on rms who would lose a relatively low-cost source of nancing.
However, rms face up relevant renancing decisions even upon TFR payments at job
separations and/or advanced withdrawals (see e.g. Garibaldi and Pacelli, 2008). Calcagno
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et al. (2011) evaluate the impact of pension reforms on small and medium size rms
renancing costs. Providing a quantitative measure of the expected outgoing amount due
to job separations and advanced withdrawals, our analysis leads to resize the costs rms
would incur in case of TFR diversion to pension funds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section (2) introduces the probabilistic sequential
model for the accumulation of the TFR. The dataset used for the empirical analysis is
described in section (3): The econometric approach and results are reported in Section (4)
and Section (5) while in section (6) we derive the expected TFR distribution between the
ETFRRETt , the ETFR
BUF
t and the ETFR
LIQ
t as dened above. Section (7) concludes.
2 The model for the accumulation of the TFR
In this section we model the expected evolution of the three components of the TFR over
the working life careers.
According to the legal setup, starting from the rst year of the job relationship, the
employer accumulates on the worker ws behalf a yearly contribution equal to
 
1
13:5

of his
annual gross wage, yt The accumulated TFR is rewarded at a partially xed annual rate
(1:5%) linked to the ination rate  8:Thus, the TFR evolves according to the following9:
TFRt = TFRt 1(1 + (0:015 + 0:75)) +
yt
13:5
(1)
where TFRt 1 is the stock available at the end of year t 1, TFRwt is the stock available
at the end of t, given the accrued rate of return (0:015 + 0:75 ) and the accumulated
fraction
 
1
13:5

of the annual labor income yt:
The accumulated TFR is paid to the worker upon job termination, regardless of its
reason, or at retirement. Under specic circumstances, the employees working more than
8For simplicity, to ease the presentation of the model, we assume a constant ination rate. The
assumption is maintained also in the empirical section across all simulation since no widely accepted
stochastic process for inationary dynamics has been successfully estimated and being their modelling
beyond the scope of the analysis carried out here. In particular, in all simulations,  is set to 2%
accounting for a real yielding rate of 1%:
9In the following equations, all the variables but the ination rate are intended indexed at the indi-
vidual worker level, w: However, to ease the exposition the index w has been suppressed.
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eight consecutive years with the same employer can obtain a partial withdrawal on the
accumulated TFR10.
In this paper, we aim at deriving the amount of the TFR that at each period t of the
working life career is expected to continue to accumulate (ETFRRETt ), the amount that
is expected to be paid upon the termination of the job relationship (ETFRBUFt ) and the
amount that is expected to be withdrawn in advance for specic needs (ETFRLIQt ). To
this aim, we consider a probabilistic model for the accumulation of the TFR that enables
to evaluate, at each t, the amount of the TFR that is potentially available conditionally
on the individuals working life career and decompose it into the three components of
interest.
According to our model, at the beginning of t, the individual may be employed with
probability peit 1 or unemployed with probability p
u
t 1 = 1  pet 1: In each t, the transition
between the two labor market states is modelled as a time-nonhomogeneous semi-Markov
process11 driven by the transition matrix t; where
jit = Pr obt(xt = ijxt 1 = j) i = e; u; j = e; u and t = 0; :::; T (2)
with initial probability distribution i0 = Pr ob(x0 = i), i = e; u:
At the beginning of t, the individual, employed with probability pet 1, is entitled to the
amount of accumulated TFR, TFRt 1. During t, she remains employed with probability
eet and decides whether to take an advanced withdrawal on TFRt 1 or not. She takes
an advanced withdrawal with probability t; while with probability (1  t) she does not
10According to the Italian law, employees with more than 8 years of service are entitled to early
withdrawals from the accrued stock during the same job to buy a primary residence for themselves or
their sons or to cover exceptional medical expenses. The amount withdrawn should not be higher than
70% of the account and at rmwide level, only 10% of employees with at least 8 year seniority and up to
4% of total employees are allowed (each year) to take advanced withdrawals.
11In particular, the transition process between the two states of interest, employment and non-
employment, are allowed to be both time and duration dependent.
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take it12 and the amount that is expected to be withdrawn in advance is13
TFRLIQt = TFRt 1t(1 + 0:015 + 0:75) (3)
Since she remains employed she receives the annual labor income yt; thus the fraction 
1
13:5

of it is accumulated on her TFR account which grows also by the rate of return
(0:015 + 0:75 t ) on the portion of the initial stock TFRt 1 not withdrawn in advance.
Conditionally on the continuity of the job relationship over t; the amount of the TFR
that is expected to be available at the end of period t is
TFR
RET je
t = TFRt 1(1  t)[1 + (0:015 + 0:75)] +
yt
13:5
(4)
During period t, the individual employed with probability pet 1 may experience a job
separation with probability eut , upon which she receives the amount
14
TFRBUFt = TFRt 1(1 + 0:015 + 0:75) (5)
During t; the individual unemployed with probability put 1 starts a new job relationship
with probability uet receiving the annual income yt, thus the fraction
yt
13:5
is accumulated
on her TFR account at the end of t
TFR
RET ju
t =
yt
13:5
(6)
12The restrictions on advanced withdrawals may be overcome upon the employer approval. Indeed in
our data we do nd evidence that workers with less than 8 years of seniority or employed in small size
rms (less than 25 employees) take withdrawals, and that the amount may be higher than the 70% of
the existing stock. Thus our analysis of the advanced withdrawing behavior is extended to include all
observed withdrawals which satisfy the conditions detailed below. In particular, as specied in section 3,
advanced withdrawals are dened as negative changes in TFR evidenced before the last year of service
in case of job relationships that last at least 4 years and if they amount at least to 400 euro and if they
are at least 20% of the stock accrued. This is taken into account when the Liquidity -TFR is evaluated.
13We assume that withdrawals are obtained at the end of t..
14We assume that the accrued position is obtained at the end of t.
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At each t; the expected amount of the TFR at retirement is
ETFRRETt = p
e
t 1TFR
RET je
t + p
u
t 1TFR
RET ju
t =
= pet 1
ee
t TFRt 1(1  t)[1 + (0:015 + 0:75)] + pet 1eet yt13:5 + put 1uet yt13:5
(7)
while the amount expected to be available as liquidity is15
ETFRLIQt = p
e
t 1
ee
t TFRt 1t(1 + 0:015 + 0:75) (8)
and the amount expected to be available as bu¤er is
ETFRBUFt = p
e
t 1
eu
t TFRt 1(1 + 0:015 + 0:75) (9)
The three components sum up to the TFR potentially available at the end of each t
conditional on the working career till t16
ETFRt = p
e
t 1TFRt 1[1 + (0:015 + 0:75)] + p
e
t
yt
13:5
(10)
In this paper, we evaluate (7)  (9) and their relative role with respect to the amount
of TFR potentially available at the end of each period t of the working life career condi-
tionally on being employed in t:
RETt =
ETFRRETt
ETFRt
(11)
LIQt =
ETFRLIQt
ETFRt
(12)
BUFt =
ETFRBUFt
ETFRt
(13)
To evaluate (7)   (9) at each point of the working careers, given the expected annual
15According to the adopted time setting, all the stock variables are evaluated at the end of t and
thus are comparable on a "like to like" basis, thus, the ETFRLIQt ,the ETFR
BUF
t and ETFR
RET
t are
capitalized at the xed interest rate r:
16In the appendix A:1 we show how we derive the expected TFR at the end of each t. Importantly, it
is not a conditional expectation tout court, however it may be interpreted as the conditional amount of
the TFR available at each t is evaluated taking into account the chance of having used it in the past.
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labor income yt as well as the ination rate  ; we have to detect the transition probability
distributions eet , 
ue
t and 
eu
t and p
e
t 1, p
u
t 1, and the the probability of taking advanced
withdrawals t. In particular, to obtain the transition distributions between the two
relevant labor market states we develop a reduced-form analysis of the employment and
nonemployment duration of Italian employees in the private sector controlling for both
observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In section 4:we detail the empirical analysis and
report the results.
The proportion that is expected to be taken in advance for specic needs is a¤ected
directly by t and indirectly by the chance of not experiencing a job separation. In section
5 we present the empirical approach and results for the advanced withdrawing behavior
(t ) observed in the data.
In section 6 we report the results on the expected distribution of the TFR implied by
the derived probability distributions. In the following section we describe the data that
we use to conduct the empirical analysis.
3 The Data
In this paper we use the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) provided by Laboratorio
Riccardo Revelli. WHIP is a database of individual work histories, based on INPS (the
Italian National Social Security Institute) administrative archives. The panel consists of
a random sample (1 : 180) drawn from the full archive of a dynamic population of about
370; 000 permanently and temporary employed in the private sector or self-employed or
retired over the period 1985   2004. The dataset allows observing the main episodes of
each individuals working career. The main drawbacks of the data is that they do not
convey information on household composition, education, and other relevant demographic
variables.
For this paper purposes, we consider blue and white collar employees working full
time17 in the private sector, aged between 20 and 60 years old. Our sample covers about
62; 000 workers, 72% are men and 28% are women, the median age of men is 36, while the
17Part time workers correspond to the 8.9 percent of the sampled population.
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median age for women is 33. We observe multiple job spells over the period 1985 200218.
We exclude from the analysis job spells left truncated at January 1985 since for them we
cannot distinguish true new hiring, thus we end up with a total of about 145; 000 single
job spells19 .
Table 1 reports the distribution of observed jobs by occupation. Males job spells,
which represent the 65% of the total number of job spells, are more densely concentrated
in blue collar occupations than femalesjob spells (88% against 67%). Manufacturing is
the largest industry for both males (38%) and females (37%), the second one for males
is construction (27%) which instead accounts only for 1% of total females jobs. The
remaining industries, here called Services20, cover 60% and 36% of femalesand males
jobs respectively. Small and medium size rms (less then 20 employees) provide the
majority of jobs (about 56%) for both males and females, while about 7% of job spells are
provided by rms with more than 1; 000 employees. The majority of jobs, 52% of the total,
are located in northern regions, 17% in the central regions and 30% in south, however,
the gender gap is higher in southern regions where males hold the 64% of observed jobs.
In Figure 1 we report, in left and right panel respectively, the (mean) annual earnings
proles by type of occupation for female and male workers. The earnings prole for
blue and white collars exhibits upward slope over the life cycle with a reverse Ushape
reaching the maximum at the age of 50th. Annual labor income for white collars is steadily
increasing till age of 40th while it is quite at for blue collars: the average annual growth
rate is about 5% and 3% for male and female white collars respectively, while for blue
collars, both male and female, it is 1%. The gender gap in annual earnings, measured as
the he ratio of female earnings to male earnings is increasing over the life cycle reecting
di¤erences in education, experience, labor supply and possibly discrimination.
In Figure 2 we report the (mean) stock of the accumulated TFR by type of occupation
for males and females, respectively. The inverse Ushaping of the TFR reects the labor
18We use the restricted sample since complete information job spells for years 2003 and 2004 are not
yet available.
19Left truncated job spells account for 16% of the total job spells.
20For this paper purposes, industries included in the macrosector Services are: Utilities, Trade, Trans-
ports and others.
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income dynamics over the working life careers. Di¤erences in levels and growth rates of
annual labor income translates in di¤erent TFR-age proles, thus, the TFR accrued for
white collars is sensibly higher than for blue collars, while the stock accumulated for
females is lower with respect to males.
In addition to earnings, also job stability a¤ects the amount of the accumulated TFR.
As detailed in the previous section, to evaluate the expected distribution of the TFR
we rely on the analysis of the discontinuity of job careers. Since the data used in this
paper originate from administrative archives we are unable to distinguish voluntary from
involuntary job interruption spells. Consequently, we cannot distinguish, among the ob-
served non-employment episodes, true unemployment spells from the out of the labor force
spells. In this paper, we treat equally all the observed job interruptions and evaluate the
chance of not being employed over the life cycle and its implications for the expected
TFR accumulation process. Given this clarication, hereafter, we use indi¤erently the
term unemployment and non-employment state. In Table 2 we report the average dura-
tion of employment and unemployment spells21 by age classes22. The mean duration of
job spells is hump shaped with respect to age at entry, while the unemployment duration
appears to be convex in initial age. In particular, employment tends on average to last
longer than unemployment at middle ages suggesting a higher probability of being em-
ployed during this phase of the working life with respect to younger and older ages. If
this is the case, given the observed hump shaping in labor income prole, then we should
observe at middle ages the highest values of the expected Retirement TFR, i.e. the TFR
that is expected to continue to accrue until retirement.
The stock of TFR is a¤ected also by the advanced withdrawing propensity. According
to the Italian law, employees with more than 8 years of service are entitled to early
withdrawals from the accrued stock during the same job to buy a primary residence for
themselves or their sons or to cover exceptional medical expenses. The amount withdrawn
21The unemployment spells are dened as starting at the end of a recorded job spells and ending at
the re-employment in the private sector (observed in the panel), provided the workers does not retire in
the period 1985-2002; if re-employment does not happen before the end of 2002 or the worker does note
retire I treat the unemployment spell as censored.
22Age is measured at the beginning of the spells.
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should not be higher than 70% of the account and at rmwide level, only 10% of employees
with at least 8 year seniority and up to 4% of total employees are allowed (each year)
to take advanced withdrawals23. However, these restrictions may be overcome upon the
employer approval. Indeed in our data we do nd evidence that workers with less than 8
years of seniority or employed in small size rms (less than 25 employees) take withdrawals,
and that the amount may be higher than the 70% of the existing stock. Thus our analysis
of the advanced withdrawing behavior is extended to include all observed withdrawals
which satisfy the conditions detailed below.
In particular, to study the advanced withdrawing behavior we do create a binary
variableWITH indicating whether the worker takes advanced withdrawal from the existing
stock of TFR. WITH takes value 1 if theres a negative change in TFR and 0 if not.
More precisely, WITH is equal to 1 if a negative change in TFR occurs before the last
year of service in case of jobs that last at least 4 years and if it amounts at least to
400 euro and if it is at least 20% of the stock accrued24. The sample composition of
the spells that last at least 4 years is reported in the last column of Table 1: In this
subsample, males are slightly more represented (67%), suggesting that on average males
achieve longer tenures than females25. The manufacturing sector provides a higher number
(58%) of more tenured jobs rather than construction (9%) and the services (33%) sectors.
Relatively longer contracts are more frequent in the North -West (36%). Small rms (with
less than 20 employees) are under represented in the sample of more tenured job relations,
while largest rms (more than 200 employees) are more represented in it.
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics on advanced withdrawals observed on the sub-
sample of job relationship that last at least 4. The total numbers of observed advanced
withdrawals is modest, only the 4:8% of individuals-years pairs is a¤ected by withdrawals
which correspond to the 8:4% of the total number of observed job relationships lasting
23According to these limits at rmwide level rms with less than 25 employees may not allow them to
take advanced withdrawals from the stock of TFR.
24The choice of these arbitrary threshold is due to limit the role of the measurement error of the event
of interest (Garibaldi and Pacelli, 2008).
25Table 1 shows that the median duration of malesemployment spells is one years, sligthly less that
for females (1:16 years). However, when employment spells which last more than (or equal to) 4 years
are considered, the median duration for males is slightly higher (7 years vs 6:8 years).
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more than 4 years. Table 3 in rst column reports the distribution of advanced with-
drawals across individual and occupational characteristics over individual-year observa-
tions. The propensity to withdraw measured with respect the individual-year pairs is quite
homogeneous across occupational characteristics, while it shows some peculiar di¤erences
when measured with respect the number of job relations as reported in the second column
of Table 2. According to our data (see Table 3, second column) advanced withdrawals are
more frequent in medium and large rms (13% in rms with more than 1000 employees,
around to 9:4% in rms with 20   199 employees, 8:4% in rms with 10   19 employees
and 6:3% in rms with less than 10 employees). The highest percentage of jobs a¤ected
by withdrawals is observed in the north-western regions (9%), while the lowest is found in
southern regions (8:6%). In the manufacturing sector, the 9:7% of jobs are interested by
a withdrawal while the corresponding value for construction sector is 5:7%. White collars
show a higher propensity (9:3%) to withdraw then blue collars (8%) while females tend
to withdraw less frequently than males (7:3% against 8:7%).
Figure 3 reports the age distribution of the propensity to withdrawal for female and
male workers, by cohort and occupation. Females show on average less propensity to
withdraw than males at all ages. The propensity to withdraw is hump shaped with respect
to age, workers aged between 30 and 40 years old are more likely to take the anticipation
option than the youngest (20  30 years old) and the elderly (40  50 and more than 50).
The average proportion of withdrawals is 4:8%, starting from the minimum 3%, at age 24,
it increases with age and reaches a peak of about 6% around 35 years old and stabilize at
a level of about 3:5% at older ages. This evidence seems to conrm that the anticipated
withdrawals, being more frequent at younger and middle ages, are more likely to serve for
home purchasing rather than for medical care.
4 Empirical analysis of working life careers
In this section we carry out the analysis on working life careers to derive the empiri-
cal counterparts of the process that drives the evolution of the TFR. We rely on non
parametric and parametric duration analysis of employment and unemployment spells to
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determine the transition distributions among labor market states.
4.1 Non parametric analysis
In Figure 4, we plot the Kaplan-Meier (K-M) empirical hazard rates from the employment
and unemployment status respectively against the length of employment/unemployment
spells. In the left chart of Figure 4 we plot the hazard function for employment spells.
The decreasing shape of the hazard rate is evidence of negative duration dependence for
job spells. Thus, the probability of a job separation is an inverse function of the job
tenure indicating that job relationships are much more unstable at their start, while they
become more stable as the tenure gets longer.
The right chart of Figure 4 plots the K-M hazard function for unemployment spells.
The downward-slope of the hazard is evidence of negative duration dependence indicating
that the long-term unemployed have less chance of nding a new job than the short-term
unemployed. Negative duration dependence is well documented in literature (see e.g.
Heckman and Borjas, 1980; Flinn and Heckman, 1982; and Lynch, 1989). It may be due
to the fact that long unemployment durations discourage workers to search a new job
(Schweitzer and Smith, 1974). Moreover, it may be due to deterioration of skills (see
e.g. Pissarides, 1992), or it may be signal of unobserved lower productivity (Vishwanath,
1989), or it may be the result of strong competition for jobs among workers. Moreover,
duration dependence in unemployment may arise in a framework were job opportunities
are spread through an explicitly network of social contacts (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson,
2004).
In the next subsection we proceed to analyze parametrically the nature of the rela-
tionship among the individual and occupational characteristics and the hazards allowing
for unobserved heterogeneity.
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4.2 Parametric analysis
4.2.1 Econometric specication
We carry out the parametric analysis of employment and unemployment spells estimating
two separate continuous time parametric Weibull models to assess the impact of causal
variables on the extent of the duration dependence in employment and unemployment
status26. We privilege continuous time to discrete time techniques as in the rst case
results are invariant to the time unit used to record the available data (Flinn and Heckman,
1982) and thus enabling to derive the life cycle prole of the probabilities conditional on
whatever length of the employment/unemployment spells. Moreover, since the presence
of unmeasured variables could give rise to spurious negative duration dependence (see
Heckman, 1991), we take into account the impact of unobserved heterogeneity and we
allow for a multiplicative shared frailty distributed as a gamma27.
According to the adopted approach, the instantaneous hazard rates for unemployment
(u) and employment (e) spells are modelled as following:
hj (t) = hj0(t
j) exp
 
0XA j with j = u; e (14)
where, tj is the elapsed duration in a given state, h
j
0(t
j) = (tj)
is the baseline hazard
that here takes the Weibull distribution, 0XA is a linear combination of observed de-
mographic and occupational characteristics, j is the multiplicative e¤ect that captures
unobserved heterogeneity.
Observed heterogeneity is controlled for by a set of covariates XA that capture indi-
vidual and job characteristics.
Previous studies evidence that transitions between labor market states are a¤ected by
time elapsed in the current state but also by time spent in the previous state. (see for
example Heckman and Borjas, 1980; Heckman and Flinn, 1982), thus, we allow for both
26We choose this model instead of the widely used semiparametric proportional Coxs model because
the latter does not specify a parametric form for the hazard preventing from deriving the transition
probabilities of interest. In many cases, the two approaches (parametric vs semiparametric) produce
similar results in term the e¤ect of explanatory variables on the hazard rate (see e.g Petrongolo, 2001).
27The data that we use convey information on multiple spells per workers, thus allowing for shared
frailty entails modelling heterogeneity among workers as a random e¤ect.
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duration and lagged duration dependence as well as time dependence. Among covariates
we include age, daily salary which capture the time dependence, as well as the length
of the previous employment (non-employment) spell which captures the lagged duration
dependence. In addition we consider explanatory variables that are xed over the spell
and over the life cycle and are measured at the beginning of the spell28, they include:
cohort, gender, type of occupation, industry, rm size and geographic area.
4.2.2 Results
Table 4 displays the estimated coe¢ cients and the marginal e¤ects for the employment
duration model29. According to our results all kinds of the allowed dependence are sig-
nicant. In particular, we nd evidence of negative current duration dependence, i.e. the
longer the time elapsed in a job spell the more likely the worker will remain employed.
We nd that theres signicant lagged duration dependence, i.e. the longer the previous
unemployment spell the higher the risk of exiting the current employment spell. These
results support the evidence that unemployment episodes may have a scarring e¤ect on
future labor market histories both in terms of subsequent earnings (Arulampalam, 2001)
and in terms of subsequent risk of job separation (Arulampalam et al., 2001 and Gregg,
2001). Moreover, according to the human capital theory explanation the unemployment
spell induces a deterioration of individual skills but also lower opportunity to accumulate
work experience: the longer an unemployment spell the higher the loss of productivity
which induces a higher probability of subsequent job termination. Indeed, the probabil-
ity of being employed depends on the level of wage at the beginning of the spell which
seems to act as a proxy of the workerslevel of productivity: the higher the wage at the
beginning of the job spell the higher the workers productivity which contributes to lower
the probability of job termination.
Our results support the evidence of time dependence, too. In our specication, time
28In the duration analysis of unemployment spells, the job related covariates are xed at the value
taken at the end of the previous employment spell.
29Negative marginal e¤ects (positive coe¢ cients for the hazard rate) indicate that the covariates reduces
the duration, while positive marginal e¤ects (negative coe¢ cients for the hazard rate) indicate that the
covariates increases the duration.
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dependence is introduced by controlling for the workers age at the beginning of the job
spells. We nd that the older the worker at the beginning of the spell the lower the risk of
exiting it and the longer the job tenure. This pattern reverses after reaching the middle
age, as evidenced by the (signicant) second order term of the polynomial in age.
The risk of job separation is less likely for men than for women. Women are thus more
likely to encounter discontinuous careers. Job interruptions in the construction industry
are more frequent than in the manufacturing and the services industries. North- Western
and Central regions are those with longer job relations, while shorter tenures characterize
jobs in the South and North-East. Not surprisingly, the probability of separation is
monotonically decreasing with the dimension of the rm, shorter tenures are more frequent
in small rms and become longer as the average dimension increases. In our data, young
cohorts face higher job instability than older cohorts, which is not surprising since young
cohorts are more a¤ected by xed-term contracts with respect to the older cohorts.
Table 5 shows the results for the unemployment duration model. Our estimates doc-
ument negative current duration dependence for the unemployment status. In addition,
we support the evidence for all kinds of duration dependence. In particular, Table 5
shows that the longer the past employment spell the higher the chance of exiting the cur-
rent unemployment spell becoming employed. This evidence supports the view that the
longer the employment spell the greater the productivity enhancement from the work-
ing experience which may result in a higher probability of terminating the subsequent
unemployment spell. Indeed, the probability of remaining unemployed depends on the
level of wage at the beginning of the spell. Here, we are analyzing the unemployment
duration, thus the wage measured at the beginning of the spell is the last wage received
in the previous employment spell. Our result indicates that the level of wage earned upon
termination of the preceding job experience taken as a proxy of the level of the workers
productivity may act as a signal a¤ecting the chance of new job nding.
Time dependence is signicant also in determining the nature of the unemployment
persistence: the higher the age at entry the higher the chance of terminating the current
unemployment spell, although this pattern reverses at old ages as indicated by the second
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order term of the polynomial in age.
The chance of exiting the unemployment status is lower for females who are more
likely to be involved in non market activities than males (see e.g. Lynch, 1989).
In our specication, we evaluate the inuence of last job occupation characteristics on
the current unemployment duration. Workers who face job interruptions from medium
and large size rms have a lower chance of getting a new job. For workers in the Northern
regions, especially Eastern ones, the hazard rate of nding a job is higher than in the rest
of Italy. These ndings, together with the evidence on the duration of job spells support
the importance of local conditions in determining the dualistic nature of the Italian formal
labor market.
Finally, younger cohorts are more likely to exit from the unemployment spells with
respect to older cohorts. This evidence, coupled with the signicant higher instability
of job relations for younger cohorts is coherent with the more widespread use of exible
contracts for young workers since middle `90s, as documented in Fugazza (2011), among
others.
Importantly, in case of both employment and unemployment durations, our results
are robust to the unobserved heterogeneity.
According to our results, both duration and lagged duration dependence turn out to
a¤ect signicantly the transition process between the two states. Thus we have to rely
on simulation techniques to derive the probability distributions of interest, namely, the
transition probabilities from employment to unemployment and viceversa (eet ; 
eu
t and
uet ) as well as the unconditional probability distribution of being unemployed (p
u
t ) over
the life cycle. In particular, we simulate the entire working careers for the representative
workers of all G working groups who are assumed enter the labor market at the age of 20
and to retire at the age 60. For each representative worker g we simulate, according to the
estimated Weibull models, a large number of possible survival times in the initial state,
i.e. employment or unemployment. Using the same methodology we simulate the ongoing
spells until the age of 6030. In Figure 5; we report the life cycle proles for the transition
30In the Appendix we outline the simulation technique followed to derive the probability distributions
of interest.
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distributions eet and 
eu
t implied by the simulated working life careers. Both are hump
shaped with respect to age implying an hump shaped probability of being employed and
thus a "U" shaped unemployment probability prole over the life cycle.
5 Empirical analysis of advanced withdrawals
5.1 Econometric specication
In this section we carry out the analysis on the advanced withdrawing behavior. The
decision of taking an advanced withdrawal is modelled through a latent variable Y 
Y it = i + 
0XBit + uit (15)
and
WITH = 1 if Y  > 0
WITH = 0 otherwise
(16)
XBit is the vector of observed demographic and occupational characteristics for the
individual i time t, i is the individual random e¤ect31 and WITH is the indicator
variable introduced in section 3 denoting whether the worker i at time t takes an advanced
withdrawal from the existing stock of TFR . In this work, we favour random against xed
e¤ects since a large number of workers do not display time variation in the withdrawing
behavior32. Among explanatory variables introduced and discussed in section 3 we include
a third order polynomial in age, gender, industry, geographic area, rm size, type of
occupation, the birth year cohort, the logarithm of annual earnings received in year t and
the logarithm of the accumulated stock of TFR at the end of previous year (t  1).
31We assume that individual specic e¤ects are unrelated to observable characteristics restricting the
distribution of heterogeneity.
32In section 3, we show that the 95% of individual-year pairs is not a¤ected by advanced withdrawals.
20
5.2 Results
In Table 6 we report the results for the coe¢ cient estimates and their standard errors 33.
The cubic polynomial function captures well the hump-shaped age prole of withdrawals
at young ages, when probably the TFR is used to nance the home purchase and when
people are more likely to face liquidity constraints. The probability of taking a withdrawal
is in fact increasing with age till 35  40 years old and then slightly decreases (see Figure
7). These results can be reconciled with the empirical evidence on liquidity constraints. In
Jappelli (1990), Cannari and Ferri (1997) and Fabbri and Padula (2001) is shown that the
age has a negative e¤ect on the probability of being liquidity constrained. Magri (2002)
found that age has a positive e¤ect on the demand of debt and that the probability of
being subscriber of a mortgage increases until middle ages. Since the ETFRLIQt plays the
strongest role when individuals are young and are more likely to face binding liquidity
constraints, we conjecture that it is used more likely for home purchasing than for medical
care expenses.
Women are less likely to take withdrawals than men and on average blue collars are
more likely to withdraw than white collars. Workers in Southern of Italy are more likely
to take advanced withdrawals. The sector of activity is signicantly relevant in order to
disentangle which group of workers is more likely to take a withdraw from their TFR
while our analysis does not evidence a clear cut relation between rm size and the chance
of taking withdrawal. The data show that, with respect to workers employed in the con-
struction industry, those who work in manufacturing and in services are less likely to take
a withdrawal. Younger cohorts show a higher probability of taking advanced withdrawals.
Finally, the probability is higher the lower the level of annual labor income and the higher
the accumulated stock of TFR supporting the view that anticipated withdrawals from the
TFR are taken to overcome liquidity constraints when also credit rationing is at playing.
Taking the type of occupation as a proxy of the level of education attained we can recon-
33The performed Wald test indicates that the coe¢ cients are jointly signicant at 10% level. The
log-likelihood ratio test conrms that the panel-level variance component is important. supporting the
preference for the panel over the pooled estimation.The estimator used relies on Gauss-Hermite quad-
trature to evaluate the log likelihood and derivatives. Results are stable under alternative quadrature
approximations.
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cile our results with the empirical evidence on the impact of personal characteristics on
both the debt market participation and on the probability of being liquidity constrained.
Magri (2002) nds that less educated people and in general low income earners are more
likely to face credit constraints in terms of loan size. Thus, these results seem to con-
rm that advanced withdrawals are taken more frequently in case of liquidity constraints
combined with the higher chance of being credit rationed.
6 Expected evolution of the TFR
In this section we report results for the expected distribution of the TFR over the life
cycle ((11)   (13)). For each working group g;we evaluate the potential amount TFRt
available at each age conditional on being employed (10) as well as the three components
(11)   (13) using the probability distributions obtained in section 4 (eet ; eut , uet and
pet ; p
u
t ) as well as (t) the advanced withdrawal behavior predicted according to the model
estimated in section 534.
In Tables 7 and 8, we report for male and female workers the expected distribution
of the TFR among the tree components (11)  (13):The results are reported by working
groups dened according demographic and occupational characteristics: gender, type of
occupation, geographic area, industry and rm size, age and birth year cohort. In Tables 7
and 8; we focus on the expected composition of the TFR evaluated for workers belonging
to three birth year cohorts (1950 -59, 1960-69, 1970-79), at the age of 25; 40 and 60
years old and working in small and large rm size (with less than 10 and more than 1000
employees, respectively).
According to our results the portion of the TFR that is expected to be accumulated
until retirement represents the main component being on average about 67% against an
amount of 31% that is expected to be paid upon job separation, while the remaining 2% is
on average withdrawn in advance to nance specic needs. In particular, the amount that
is expected to be accumulated as ETFRRETt is positively correlated with the employment
34In simulations, the annual labor income yt is proxied by the average value observed by age, gender
and type of occupation. The annual ination  t is set to the value of 2%.
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probability which is hump shaped over the life cycle with substantial heterogeneity across
working groups. Males workers and white collars display the highest amount of TFR that
is expected to be accumulated until retirement. As shown in Tables 7 and 8, at the age
of 60, the average expected ETFRRETt accumulated by male workers is about 71% of the
total while the corresponding value for females is about 64%. The gender gap is higher
for blue than white collars. For blue collars, who experience higher job instability over
the life cycle, the average amount that is expected to be available as Retirement-TFR
is about the 65% for males and 57% for females. The average expected ETFRRETt for
males white collars is about 77% while for females is 70%. Di¤erences among females and
males are stronger in southern regions. Workers in the North of Italy display more stable
working life careers which implies an expected ERetirement TFR higher of about 8%
than workers in south, a gap that is less strong for male workers (7%) than for females
(9%).
Di¤erences in job mobility imply also a great dispersion of the expected ETFRBUFt
across workers. The amount potentially available as a bu¤er displays a Ushaped proles
over the life cycle reecting the dynamics of the individual probability of job separation
with respect to age. At middle ages (40 years old), the di¤erence in the amount expected
to be available for blue and white collars is about 13% while the gap between females
and males is about 8%; on average. For workers in southern region the potential bu¤er
component is on average 10% higher than for workers in the North West. The di¤erent
degree of job stability at industry level leads to an expected ETFRBUFt for workers in
the construction industry on average 12% higher than in the manufactory industry. The
average gap in the expected bu¤er component explained by the rm size is modest. The
amount in small rms is on average 8% higher than in large rms. This evidence contrasts
sharply with Fugazza and Teppa (2005) who perform a similar empirical analysis and nd
that the variation of the ETFRBUFt is almost explained by the average dimension of the
rm. However, Fugazza and Teppa (2005) evaluate the proportion of the TFR that is
expected to paid during the working life considering job separations only, which are higher
for small rms. In this paper, instead, we look at the entire working life, and thus we thus
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we take into account the probability of job separation conditional on being employed and
the chance re-employment at each stage of the life cycle. Thus, the observed relatively
modest gap between small and large rms is due to the composition e¤ect between the
probability of job separation - higher for workers in small rms, and the probability of
re-employment - lower if workers are dismissed by large rms. These results suggest that
there is a potential relevant role for the ETFRRETt , which is stronger for the young,
the women and the blue collars who work in small rms operating in the less developed
geographic areas. In the present work we estimated the importance of the TFR as a
potential bu¤er for precautionary motives on the basis of administrative data which do
not allow to evaluate the actual role played by the TFR withdrawn.
As reported in Tables 7 and 8, the ETFRLIQt accounts for a small proportion of the
accumulated TFR for all representative workers. The proportion of the accumulated TFR
that is expected to be withdrawn in advance is humped shaped over the life cycle when
both the accumulated TFR and the probability of being employed are higher relatively to
young and old ages. The highest values are found at middle ages for all working groups.
Men and white collars exhibit the highest expected amount of withdrawing, on average
1% higher than women and blue collars35. Since our analysis is based on administrative
data we are not able to distinguish between advanced withdrawals for home purchasing
or for health reasons. However, we observe that, ceteris paribus, the ETFRLIQt plays the
strongest role when workers are relatively younger and/ or likely face binding liquidity
constraints we conclude that the amount withdrawn in advance is probably mostly used
to buy a house.
7 Conclusions
The TFR has been advocated as panacea to the lack of resources for Italian employees
supplementary pension provisions: pension reforms introduce strong incentives to divert
TFR ows to pension funds and heavily penalize withdrawals upon job dismissal. Thus,
35According to results in section 5, white collars have a lower propensity to take advanced withdrawals.
However, here we evaluate the expected proportion of the amount taken in advance, which is a¤ected
also by the probability of being employed.
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diversion to pension funds is appropriate for workers facing continuous job careers since
it represents a way to accumulate substantial retirement wealth exploiting tax benets
and potentially high rewarding investment opportunities. However, since the TFR may
also act as a protection against unemployment or specic needs, the more discontinuous
the job careers and the higher the propensity to take advance withdrawals the lower the
amount potentially available at retirement and thus less convenient the participation to
pension funds.
In this paper, we evaluate the expected distribution of the TFR among the three com-
ponents implied by the observed mobility across labor market states and the propensity
to take withdrawals before job termination. The rst two components, ETFRRETt and
ETFRBUFt are the two sides of the same coin, being related to the employment risk: other
things being equal, the expected ETFRRETt depends on the chance of being employed and
of remaining employed, while the expected ETFRRETt is related to the chance of loosing
it. The amount of the expected ETFRLIQt is directly linked to the advanced withdrawing
propensity.
Our results, evidence that on average the main potential role of the TFR is to nance
consumption upon the end of working life, dened here ETFRRETt . However, we nd
substantial heterogeneity across workers. Several working groups, namely females, blue
collars, workers in the construction industry and in southern regions, face relative high
job instability due to high probability of job separation as well as lower chance of re-
employment, translating in high values of theETFRRETt and lower chance of accumulating
a substantial amount of TFR at retirement.
The empirical analysis on the determinants of withdrawals points out that only a
minority of workers cashes out their TFR during the working life and evidences patterns
that are consistent with the demand of mortgages and home ownership. Indeed, since
withdrawals from TFR are more frequent at young ages we conclude that it is likely used
by individuals to face home purchasing rather than for health.
The main limit of our analysis is the lack of information on consumption and saving de-
cisions or on how the TFR obtained at job separation is spent, preventing from measuring
25
how much of it really serves for precautionary motives. However, our results are obtained
accounting for both the risk of job separation and the chance of re-employment, thus, if
we do not provide a precise measure of the role of TFR as precautionary wealth, at least
we are able to indicate the expected amount that fails to accumulate until retirement.
Since for a large number of coeval heterogenous workers the TFR expected to outow
is substantial, the skeptical view on its universal role as retirement wealth is supported
and serious concerns are raised on strong penalizing cashes out in case of long term
unemployment. Moreover, our results point at further investigations on even di¤erent
data sources with a specic focus on the TFR diverted to pension funds to understand
the feasibility of investment strategies suitable to account for the risk of cashing out before
retirement.
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8 Appendix
8.1 The conditional evolution of the TFR
In this Appendix we provide the proof for equation (10) in text, i.e. the potential amount
of TFR available at the end of t.
ETFRt = ETFR
RET
t + ETFR
LIQ
t + ETFR
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t =
= pet 1
ee
t TFRt 1(1  t)[1 + (0:015 + 0:75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noting that eet +
eu
t = 1 and p
e
t 1
ee
t + p
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t = p
e
t and given that r = 0:015 + 0:75 ,
then
ETFRt = p
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t 1TFRt 1[1 + (0:015 + 0:75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yt
13:5
(18)
is the amount of TFR that is potentially available at the end of t conditional the
working life career before t.
8.2 Simulating the working life careers
In this Appendix, we outline the simulation methodology used to obtain the proles of
the expected life cycle working careers from the estimated transition intensities from
employment to unemployment and vicevesa.
According to results reported in section 4, the transition process between the two states
of interest (employment and non-employment) is as a non-homogeneous semi Markov
chain. Both duration and lagged duration dependence turn out to a¤ect signicantly
the transition process between the two states. Thus, to derive the transition probability
distributions at each point of the working life we have to rely on MonteCarlo simulation
30
techniques.
In particular, for each representative worker g, we simulate the entire working careers.
We assume that working life careers stat at the age of 20 and lasts at the age of 60 years
old. At the age of 20, the representative worker may be either employed or unemployed,
being the initial probability distribution of the two states is taken from the empirical
fraction of employed to non employed at that age. We simulate the survival time T in the
initial state employment (unemployment). In particular, we simulate a large number N
(N = 5000) of lengths for the rst employment (unemployment) spell by drawing from
the Weibull distribution with shape and scale parameters that depends on the value of
the covariates as well as the estimated coe¢ cients (see Table 3 and 4). As the aim is
to generate the working histories for the average representative worker of each group g,
the parameter governing the individual heterogeneity  is set to 1. The survival time T
is thus function of the individual and job characteristics that remain xed over the life
cycle but also on characteristics that vary over the life cycle: the age and the daily salary
at the beginning of the spell and the duration of the previous simulated unemployment
(employment) spell36 Using the same methodology we simulate the ongoing spells. Thus,
for each representative worker, we end up with N simulated working histories, i.e. se-
quences of employment and unemployment spells. From each sequence, we can determine
the employment status at each age and by averaging across sequences we can obtain the
both the conditional and the unconditional probability of being employed /unemployed
at each point of the life cycle.
36In simulations, the daily salary at the beginning of the spell is proxied by the average daily salary
observed by age, gender and type of occupation.
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Table 1         Summary statistics on the sample composition 
Individual and occupational 
characteristcs  
 
Employement 
spells 
Unemployment 
Spells1 
Employment 
spells 
 length≥4 years 
Female 0.35 0.35 0.33 
Male 0.65 0.65 0.67 
                                  % Females Males All   
Manufacturing 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.58 
Construction 0.01 0.27 0.18 0.18 0.09 
Services 0.60 0.36 0.45 0.40 0.33 
North West 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.36 
North East 0.32 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.24 
Center 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 
South 0.19 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.22 
Firm size       
 1 - 9  0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.28 
 10 - 19 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 
 20 - 199 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.33 
 200 -999 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.12 
 > 1000 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.13 
Blue collar 0.67 0.88 0.80 0.81 0.74 
White collar 0.33 0.12 0.20 0.19 0.26 
Cohort 1940 - 49 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.28 
Cohort 1950 - 59 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.24 
Cohort 1960 - 69 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.33 
Cohort 1970 - 79 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.16 
                               Median      
Age at entry 26 28 27 29 28 
Daily salary 56.49 66.00 63.09 60.39 64.76 
Annual earnings 15,615.08 17,850.98 17149.16  19,772.4 
TFR 2,985.00 3,110.93 3,073.95  5,282.615 
Duration (in years) 1.16 1.00 1.08 0.69 6.92 
Num. spells 50,992 94,905 145,897 100,246 45,571 
Num subjects 17,445 44,737 62,182 62,182 28,459 
Source: WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel, years 1985-2002. 
Note: In case of unemployment spells, occupational characteristics refer to the last job spells preceding the current 
unemployment spell. 
 
 
 33
 
Table 2      Advanced Withdrawls 
Individual and occupational 
characteristics  (%) 
Percentage of 
observations 
Percentage of 
employment spells 
Female 0.05 0.08 
Male 0.05 0.09 
Industry   
Manufacturing 0.05 0.097 
Construction 0.06 0.057 
Services 0.05 0.078 
Geographic Area   
North West 0.05 0.09 
North East 0.05 0.086 
Center 0.05 0.086 
South 0.06 0.069 
Firm size   
1 – 9 0.05 0.063 
10 – 19 0.05 0.084 
20 – 199 0.05 0.094 
200 -999 0.04 0.096 
> 1000 0.05 0.131 
Type of occupation   
Blue collar 0.05 0.08 
White collar 0.05 0.093 
Num. Observations 367,797 45,571 
          Source: WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel, years 1985-2002 
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Table 3  
Employment Duration  Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Weibull model with unobserved heterogeneity 
Variable Coefficients Marginal Effects 
Age -0.068*** 0.091*** 
 [0.004] [0.005] 
Age^2/10 0.009*** -0.012*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] 
Gender (ref. Male)   
Female 0.197*** -0.256*** 
 [0.013] [0.016] 
Industry (ref. Services)   
Manufacturing -0.457*** 0.659*** 
 [0.011] [0.018] 
Construction 0.119*** -0.152*** 
 [0.015] [0.018] 
Firm size (ref. 1- 9)   
10-19 -0.125*** 0.175*** 
 [0.012] [0.017] 
20 - 199 -0.247*** 0.352*** 
 [0.011] [0.016] 
200 - 999 -0.475*** 0.803*** 
 [0.017] [0.036] 
> 1000 -0.427*** 0.71*** 
 [0.02] [0.041] 
Geographic area (ref. South)   
North West -0.437*** 0.659*** 
 [0.015] [0.025] 
North East -0.201*** 0.285*** 
 [0.015] [0.023] 
Center -0.306*** 0.46*** 
 [0.016] [0.027] 
Type of occupation (ref. Blue collar)   
White Collar -0.817*** 1.492*** 
 [0.014] [0.036] 
Length previous unemployment spell 0.155*** -0.208*** 
 [0.003] [0.004] 
Log daily salary at the beginning of the spell 0.101*** -0.135*** 
 [0.012] [0.016] 
Cohort (ref. 1979- 79)   
Cohort 1940-49 -0.010 0.015 
 [0.028] [0.038] 
Cohort 1950 -59 -0.144*** 0.202*** 
 [0.021] [0.031] 
Cohort 1960-69 -0.185*** 0.255*** 
 [0.015] [0.021] 
Constant 1.129***  
 [0.081]  
 0.895***  
 [0.003]  
 1.036***  
 [0.01]  
Log-likelihood   -58380.53     
N. observations 145,897  
           Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ; standard errors are in brackets. 
           Source: WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel, years 1985-2002 
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Table 4          
Unemployment Duration  Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Weibull model with unobserved heterogeneity 
Variable  Coefficients Marginal Effects 
      
Age 0.068***  -0.033 *** 
   [0.004]  [0.002] 
Age^2/10 -0.007*** 0.004*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] 
Gender (ref. Male) 
Female -0.914*** 0.558*** 
   [0.015]  [0.011] 
Industry (ref. Services)     
Manufacturing -0.021* 0.002 
   [0.011]  [0.005] 
Construction -0.191*** 0.087*** 
   [0.015]  [0.008] 
Firm size (ref. 1- 9)     
  10-19 0.105***  -0.057*** 
   [0.011]  [0.005] 
 20 - 199 0.042***  -0.032*** 
   [0.01]  [0.005] 
200 - 999 -0.080*** 0.019** 
   [0.017]  [0.008] 
 > 1000 -0.147*** 0.055*** 
   [0.02]  [0.01] 
Geographic area (ref. South)     
North West 0.932***  -0.363*** 
   [0.015]  [0.006] 
North East 1.021***  -0.377*** 
   [0.016]  [0.006] 
Center 0.500***  -0.201*** 
   [0.017]  [0.006] 
Type of occupation (ref. White collar)     
Blue Collar -0.415*** 0.16*** 
   [0.014]  [0.005] 
Length previous employment spell 0.035***  -0.197*** 
   [0.003]  [0.002] 
Log daily salary at the beginning of the spell 0.016***  -0.016*** 
   [0.005]  [0.002] 
Cohort (ref. 1979- 79)     
Cohort 1940-49 -0.331*** 0.113*** 
   [0.029]  [0.014] 
Cohort 1950 -59 -0.581*** 0.03** 
   [0.023]  [0.013 
Cohort 1960-69 -0.439***  -0.165*** 
   [0.017]  [0.012] 
Constant -0.583***   
   [0.065]   
 0.850***   
   [0.002]   
 2.292***   
  [0.014]   
Log-likelihood -128188.96   
N. observations 100,246   
                Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ; standard errors are in brackets. 
                Source: WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel, years 1985-2002 
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Table 5 Advanced withdrawing behaviour –Estimates of the multi-period logit model with random effetcts 
Variable  Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
Age 0.238*** 0.007*** 
  [0.047] [0.001] 
Age^2/10 -0.050*** -0.002*** 
  [0.012] [0.000] 
Age^3/100 0.003*** 0.000*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] 
Gender (ref. Male)   
Female -0.173*** -0.005*** 
  [0.022] [0.001] 
Type of occupation (ref. Blue Collar)   
White Collar -0.240*** -0.007*** 
  [0.023] [0.001] 
Geographic area (ref. Center)   
North West -0.139*** -0.004*** 
  [0.026] [0.001] 
North East -0.124*** -0.004*** 
  [0.028] [0.001] 
South 0.261*** 0.009*** 
  [0.031] [0.001] 
Firm size (ref. >1,000)   
 1 - 9 0.252*** 0.008*** 
  [0.033] [0.001] 
 10-19 0.330*** 0.011*** 
 [0.035] [0.001] 
 20 – 199 0.288*** 0.009*** 
  [0.03] [0.001] 
200 – 999 -0.032 -0.001 
  [0.034] [0.001] 
Industry (ref. Services)   
Manufacturing -0.145*** -0.005*** 
  [0.022] [0.001] 
Construction 0.283*** 0.010*** 
  [0.035] [0.001] 
Log earnings t-1 -0.406*** -0.013*** 
  [0.029] [0.001] 
Log TFR t-1 0.712*** 0.022*** 
  [0.018] [0.001] 
Tenure (Log years) 0.029 0.009 
  [0.029] [0.001] 
Cohort (ref. 1940-49)   
Cohort 1950 -59 0.143*** 0.005*** 
  [0.040] [0.001] 
Cohort 1960-69 0.294*** 0.009*** 
  [0.052] [0.002] 
Cohort 1970 -79 0.406*** 0.014*** 
  [0.060] [0.002] 
Constant -11.348***  
  [0.580]  
 0.819  
  [0.042]  
 0.169  
  [0.015]  
Log-Likelihood -66192.225  
N. observations 367,797  
     Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel, years 1985-2002 
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Table 6         Expected Distribution of TFR – Male workers 
    A) Cohort 1950-59 
    Blue Collars White Collars 
    Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 
  Age South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center 
   Manufacturing 
ETFRRET 25 0.66 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.77 0.83 0.80 0.81 0.77 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.86 0.90 0.88 0.89 
  40 0.66 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.77 0.83 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.89 
  50 0.63 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.77 0.83 0.80 0.81 0.77 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.89 
ETFRBUF 25 0.33 0.26 0.30 0.28 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.10 
  40 0.32 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.08 
  60 0.35 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.08 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
  40 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
  60 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
   Construction 
ETFRRET 25 0.54 0.63 0.59 0.59 0.66 0.73 0.70 0.71 0.66 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.77 0.83 0.80 0.81 
  40 0.55 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.66 0.73 0.70 0.71 0.66 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.78 0.83 0.81 0.81 
  60 0.52 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.63 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.64 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.77 0.83 0.81 0.81 
ETFRBUF 25 0.45 0.36 0.40 0.39 0.33 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.33 0.26 0.30 0.28 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.16 
  40 0.43 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.31 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.14 
  60 0.47 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.34 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.14 0.16 0.15 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  40 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
  60 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
   Services 
ETFRRET 25 0.58 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.70 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.72 0.74 0.81 0.86 0.83 0.84 
  40 0.60 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.71 0.78 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.81 0.86 0.84 0.84 
  60 0.56 0.63 0.60 0.61 0.68 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.81 0.87 0.84 0.85 
ETFRBUF 25 0.42 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.14 
  40 0.39 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.12 
  60 0.43 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.30 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.12 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
  40 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
  60 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
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(continued) - Expected Distribution of TFR – Male workers 
    Cohort 1960-69 
    Blue Collars White Collars 
    Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 
  Age South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center
   Manufacturing 
ETFRRET 25 0.63 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.82 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.88 0.85 0.86 
  40 0.64 0.72 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.80 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.86 
  60 0.61 0.71 0.66 0.68 0.72 0.80 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.83 0.79 0.81 0.84 0.89 0.87 0.88 
ETFRBUF 25 0.36 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.11 
  40 0.33 0.25 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.10 
  60 0.37 0.26 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.09 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  40 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
  60 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
   Construction 
ETFRRET 25 0.52 0.61 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.70 0.66 0.67 0.64 0.72 0.66 0.70 0.74 0.81 0.77 0.78 
  40 0.55 0.62 0.57 0.59 0.63 0.70 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.73 0.68 0.71 0.75 0.81 0.78 0.79 
  60 0.51 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.60 0.70 0.65 0.67 0.64 0.73 0.68 0.71 0.74 0.82 0.78 0.79 
ETFRBUF 25 0.47 0.38 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.17 0.21 0.19 
  40 0.43 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.26 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.16 
  60 0.48 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.17 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  40 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
  60 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
   Services 
ETFRRET 25 0.55 0.63 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.72 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.74 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.83 0.79 0.81 
  40 0.57 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.65 0.73 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.76 0.71 0.74 0.78 0.84 0.81 0.82 
  60 0.53 0.62 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.72 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.76 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.84 0.80 0.82 
ETFRBUF 25 0.45 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.27 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.17 
  40 0.42 0.33 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.21 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.13 0.16 0.14 
  60 0.46 0.36 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.26 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.15 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  40 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
  60 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
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(continued) - Expected Distribution of TFR – Male workers 
    Cohort 1970-79 
    Blue Collars White Collars 
    Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 
  Age South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center
   Manufacturing 
ETFRRET 25 0.61 0.67 0.62 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.72 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.85 0.86 
  40 0.61 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.73 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.72 0.79 0.75 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.85 0.85 
  60 0.58 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.71 0.79 0.75 0.76 0.71 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.83 0.88 0.86 0.86 
ETFRBUF 25 0.38 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.26 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.12 
  40 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.25 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.10 
  60 0.40 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.11 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  40 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
  60 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
   Construction 
ETFRRET 25 0.51 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.67 0.61 0.64 0.72 0.78 0.75 0.77 
  40 0.52 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.61 0.67 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.67 0.63 0.65 0.73 0.79 0.76 0.76 
  60 0.49 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.58 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.72 0.78 0.76 0.76 
ETFRBUF 25 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.38 0.31 0.37 0.33 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.21 
  40 0.47 0.40 0.44 0.43 0.36 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.35 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.18 
  60 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.20 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  40 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
  60 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
   Services 
ETFRRET 25 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.65 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.64 0.70 0.67 0.69 0.76 0.82 0.79 0.80 
  40 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.65 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.65 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.77 0.83 0.80 0.80 
  60 0.52 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.63 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.64 0.71 0.67 0.69 0.76 0.83 0.80 0.80 
ETFRBUF 25 0.46 0.40 0.43 0.41 0.34 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.22 0.16 0.19 0.18 
  40 0.44 0.38 0.42 0.38 0.32 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.32 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.15 
  60 0.47 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.36 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.35 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.16 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  40 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
  60 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
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Table 7              Expected Distribution of TFR - Female workers 
    Cohort 1950-59 
    Blue Collars White Collars 
    Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 
  Age South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center 
   Manufacturing 
ETFRRET 25 0.49 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.71 0.65 0.70 0.68 0.77 0.71 0.75 
  40 0.53 0.65 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.70 0.64 0.68 0.67 0.76 0.71 0.75 0.73 0.81 0.77 0.79 
  60 0.53 0.63 0.58 0.62 0.59 0.69 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.77 0.70 0.74 0.73 0.82 0.77 0.80 
ETFRBUF 25 0.51 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.28 0.34 0.29 0.32 0.22 0.28 0.24 
  40 0.46 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.40 0.29 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.17 0.21 0.19 
  60 0.46 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.30 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.17 0.22 0.18 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  40 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
   Construction 
ETFRRET 25 0.44 0.55 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.60 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.66 0.61 0.64 0.62 0.71 0.66 0.70 
  40 0.46 0.58 0.54 0.56 0.52 0.65 0.59 0.62 0.61 0.71 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.76 0.71 0.74 
  60 0.48 0.57 0.52 0.56 0.54 0.63 0.58 0.62 0.61 0.70 0.63 0.68 0.67 0.76 0.70 0.74 
ETFRBUF 25 0.56 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.33 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.28 0.33 0.29 
  40 0.53 0.40 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.33 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.26 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.22 0.27 0.23 
  60 0.52 0.41 0.47 0.42 0.45 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.28 0.35 0.29 0.32 0.22 0.28 0.24 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  40 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
   Services 
ETFRRET 25 0.43 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.57 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.58 0.67 0.61 0.66 
  40 0.45 0.55 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.64 0.73 0.67 0.71 
  60 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.57 0.54 0.58 0.57 0.66 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.72 0.65 0.70 
ETFRBUF 25 0.56 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.53 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.32 0.38 0.33 
  40 0.54 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.49 0.38 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.35 0.25 0.31 0.27 
  60 0.53 0.45 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.42 0.45 0.41 0.42 0.33 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.27 0.33 0.28 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  40 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  60 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
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(continued) - Expected Distribution of TFR – Female workers 
    Cohort 1960-69 
    Blue Collars White Collars 
    Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 
  Age South NorthWest 
North 
East Center South NorthWest 
North 
East Center South NorthWest 
North 
East Center South NorthWest 
North 
East Center 
   Manufacturing 
ETFRRET 25 0.54 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.64 0.74 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.78 0.85 0.81 0.83 
  40 0.57 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.79 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.86 0.83 0.84 
  60 0.53 0.65 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.75 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.79 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.86 0.83 0.84 
ETFRBUF 25 0.45 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.15 
  40 0.41 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.22 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.13 
  60 0.46 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.14 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  40 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
   Construction 
ETFRRET 25 0.46 0.55 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.60 0.61 0.57 0.67 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.76 0.72 0.74 
  40 0.48 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.65 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.68 0.64 0.66 0.70 0.77 0.74 0.75 
  60 0.45 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.63 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.67 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.77 0.73 0.74 
ETFRBUF 25 0.54 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.23 0.27 0.24 
  40 0.51 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.20 0.23 0.21 
  60 0.55 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.36 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.21 0.25 0.23 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
  40 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
  60 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
   Services 
ETFRRET 25 0.48 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.60 0.69 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.78 0.74 0.76 
  40 0.50 0.59 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.68 0.63 0.65 0.62 0.71 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.80 0.76 0.78 
  60 0.47 0.56 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.66 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.70 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.79 0.75 0.77 
ETFRBUF 25 0.52 0.42 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.39 0.30 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.20 0.25 0.22 
  40 0.49 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.30 0.35 0.32 0.36 0.27 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.22 0.19 
  60 0.52 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.33 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.19 0.23 0.21 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  40 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  60 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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(continued) - Expected Distribution of TFR – Female workers 
    Cohort 1970-79 
    Blue Collars White Collars 
    Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 Small  firms: 1-19 Large firms: >1000 
  Age South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center South NorthWest
North 
East Center 
   Manufacturing 
ETFRRET 25 0.54 0.62 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.72 0.66 0.70 0.66 0.74 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.82 0.78 0.80 
  40 0.56 0.64 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.73 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.84 0.81 0.81 
  60 0.52 0.61 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.71 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.75 0.70 0.73 0.76 0.84 0.80 0.82 
ETFRBUF 25 0.46 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.37 0.27 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.18 
  40 0.43 0.34 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.15 
  60 0.47 0.37 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.27 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.15 0.18 0.16 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
  40 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
  60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
   Construction 
ETFRRET 25 0.46 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.56 0.62 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.73 0.69 0.71 
  40 0.47 0.54 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.62 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.65 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.74 0.71 0.72 
  60 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.64 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.74 0.69 0.71 
ETFRBUF 25 0.53 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.25 0.30 0.28 
  40 0.53 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.24 
  60 0.54 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.24 0.29 0.26 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
  40 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
  60 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
   Services 
ETFRRET 25 0.48 0.55 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.62 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.66 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.75 0.71 0.73 
  40 0.50 0.57 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.61 0.67 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.77 0.72 0.75 
  58 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.62 0.59 0.60 0.57 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.76 0.72 0.74 
ETFRBUF 25 0.52 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.24 0.28 0.25 
  40 0.50 0.42 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.30 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.25 0.22 
  60 0.53 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.32 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.22 0.26 0.24 
ETFRLIQ 25 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  40 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  60 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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Figure 1    Mean Annual Earnings  
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Figure 2    Mean TFR stock 
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Figure 3     Average spell duration 
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Figure 4    Advanced withdrawal behaviour 
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4b) Males 
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Figure 5    Smoothed hazard estimates  
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Figure 6        Transition probability distributions  
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Figure 7      Withdrawal rate by age 
 
 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 20 40 60 80
AgePredicted rate Actual rate
 
Carolina Fugazza    Bibliographic Note 
  
Resarch Fellow at Università di Milano Bicocca and Researcher at CeRP-Collegio Carlo 
Alberto. She attended her Phd at Università di Torino. Her major areas of intererst are 
financial economics, international finance and labor economics. Works on this issue have 
been published on peer referred intenational journals (Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, Financial Analyist and Real Estate Economics, International Review of 
Economics and Finance) and in international working paper series (Netspar, FED St. 
Louis, CeRP and Carlo Alberto Notebooks) She has participated in international research 
projects sponsored by ICPM and World Bank. 
 
Contact information: 
Address: Piazza Ateneo Nuovo, 1 - Ed. U620126 Milano 
Tel. +39 02 6448 3230-  
Fax +39 02 6448 3085 
Email: carolina.fugazza@carloalberto.org 
